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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TITLE VII - A
BETTER SOLUTION
Sexual harassment is a serious problem in the workplace.' One
commentator suggests that as many as one half of all women will
be harassed during their careers. 2 This harassment can affect its
victim psychologically as well as physically.' Moreover, because of
its physical and psychological effects, sexual harassment often im-
pairs the job performance of its victim.'
Although cases and commentators do not completely agree as
to what constitutes sexual harassment, it can be defined as the
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of un-
equal power. 5 Typically a female employee files a complaint against
a male co-worker." The Bureau of National Affairs reports, how-
ever, that employers also receive complaints of homosexual harass-
ment, and of harassment of men by women.' Thus, there are many
variations of sexual harassment.
Intending to protect blacks and other minorities from discrim-
ination in the workplace,' Congress enacted Title VII as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964." Prior to its passage, and allegedly in an
attempt to defeat it, Congress amended Title VII to include "sex"
as a protected category.'" Little debate took place regarding this
amendment, however, and thus, Title VII's history provides little
I Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII For Sexual Hartmsment After Merkur Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 87 Co[im. L. !try. 1258, 1258 . (1 987).
2 B. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 44 (1985).
" Note, Sexual Harassment Law and the Impact of Vinson, 13 ll'AubLovmENT	 L.j. 501,
503 (1988).
4 Id.
5 B. GUTEK, supra note 2, at 44; C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT or WORIUNG
WOMEN 1 (1979).
Sexual Harassment: Employer Policies and Problems, Personnel Policies Forum Survey No.
144 (BNA), at 16-17 ( June 1987),
' Id, at 17,
" 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) (statement. of Sen. Humphrey).
" Title VII reads, in pertinent part.:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin....
42 U,S.C. * 2000e-2(a) (1981).
i" 110 CONG. Rec. 2577 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1965).
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guidance as to the intended scope of "sex" in that legislation."
Nevertheless, early cases of sex discrimination brought under Title
VII do provide some indication of its coverage.' 2 These early cases
fall into four major categories. First, some early cases involved
challenges to the outright exclusion of members of one sex from
jobs. 13 Second, several cases involved challenges to restrictions hav-
ing a disproportionate effect on women. 14 In the third group of
cases, plaintiffs challenged restrictions placed solely on women.'•
Early courts held that these three types of cases fell under Title
VII's protection. In contrast, early courts held that Title VII did
not apply to the fourth type, those cases involving challenges to an
employer's pregnancy-related policy.' 6
Despite the protection offered to victims of discrimination in
these three types of situations, early courts did not construe Title
VII to include a claim for sexual harassment in the work place.°
" Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. Rev.
877, 884 (1967). See also infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title
VII's early history.
12 See infra notes 68-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inclusion of a
claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.
E.g., Rosenield v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1971) (denying
women job of switchman on the grounds dint they are physically unable to do the work
violates Title VII); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (airline
violated Title VII by refusing to hire mates for position of flight attendant), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969)
(denying women the job of switchman violates Title VII). See infra notes 48-51 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the outright exclusion of one sex.
"E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (invalidating height arid weight
restrictions having a disproportionate effect on women); Caviale v. State of Wisconsin, Dep't
of Health & Social Servs., 744 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1984) (employer's decision to choose
from a pool of which two of two hundred members were women for job openings violated
Title VII), See infra notes 52- 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of disparate impact.
15 E.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (refusal to hire women
with pre-school-age children violates Title VII); Sprogis v. United Air Line, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir.) (no marriage rule for women violates Title VII), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand, 3'31 F. Supp. 1184, 1187-88 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (no
marriage rule for women violates Title VII). See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text
for a discussion of restrictions placed out one gender.
"E.g., General Flee. Co. v. Gilbert. 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (no violation of Title
VII where disability plan excluded pregnancy). Pregnancy has since been included under
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1981).
"E.g., Tomkins v. Public Servs. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
(sexual harassment not discrimination under Title VII), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977);
Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (court refused to recognize a
Title VII claim where plaintiff did not use department established by employer to investigate
such claims), rev'd and remanded, 600 17.2(1 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979); Conte v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-65 (D. Ariz. 1975) (woman subjected to verbal and physical
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Holding that sexual harassment is a personal proclivity, not gender
discrimination,' 8 these courts reasoned that gender was incidental
to the sexual advance or attack,'`' Although they recognized that
sexual harassment is a problem, these courts held that Title VII
does not apply to offensive sexual conduct."
Despite courts' initial hostile reaction to sexual harassment
claims, they soon recognized sexual harassment as Title VII gender
discrimination. 2 ' These courts held that gender discrimination ex-
isted when an employer conditioned a plaintiff's job on submission
to sexual relations, in effect, creating a quid pro quo because the
woman either submitted or risked losing her job. 22 Subsequent
courts extended Title VII's applicability, finding liability for gender
discrimination where an employer created a sexually hostile work
environment.23
In 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff stated a Title VII claim for
sexual harassment that created a hostile environment. 24 Since Vin-
son, courts have addressed situations less typical than that: of a man
sexual advances failed to state a claim under Title VII), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977);
Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 123 (D.D.C. 1974) (plaintiff fired 6'r
refusing her male superior's sexual advances failed to state a claim under Title VII), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 983 (D,C, Cir. 1977). Sec infra notes 72-83 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these early cases,
" E.g.. Coyne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("In the
present case, Mr. Price's conduct appears to be a personal proclivity, peculiarity ur mannerism,
By his alleged sexual advances. Mr. Price was satisfying a personal urge.").
' 9 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Servs, Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 555, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
("The gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or not even crossed at. all. While
sexual desire animated the parties, or at least one ()I' them, the gentler of each is incidental
to the claim of abuse.").
21I
2 ' E.g., Miller v. Bank of Ant., 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) (female plaintiff fired
refusing supervisor's demand lion' sexual - favors stated a claim under Title VII); Williams
v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming lower court's recognition of a Title
VII claim for sexual harassment); Temkin); v. Public Servs. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044,
1049 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff stated Title VII claim where continued employment was
conditioned upon submitting to male supervisor's sexual advances); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiff stated claim under Title VII where employer fired
her in retaliation fur her refusal to grant sexual favors).
22 See, e.g.. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989. Quid pro quo harassment is harassment in which a
supervisor demands sexual favors in exchange lOr job benefits. C. MACKINNON, supra note
5, at 32-47.
" See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 443-44 (D,C. Cir. 1981). See infra notes 84-
114 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' extension of Title VII to include
sexu al harassment claims.
24 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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harassing a woman." Although there are no reported cases allowing
a claim for males alleging sexual harassment by female employers,
commentators generally agree that men too can be victims of sexual
harassment. 26 In addition, most courts now allow a claim for homo-
sexual harassment.° Moreover, recent courts have recognized a
claim where plaintiffs' co-workers received preferential treatment
by submitting to a supervisor's sexual advances." Courts, however,
using a "but for" approach, have suggested that harassment by a
bisexual supervisor would not constitute sexual harassment because
males and females would receive the same treatment."
26 See infra notes 128-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of situations presently
covered by Title VII.
26 Conte & Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment — Some Proposals Toward More
Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 407, 417 n.41 (1982-83); Note, Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a Work Environment "Hostile"?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 857, 857
n.1 (1987); Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U.L. REv. 445, 445 n.4 (1987) [hereinafter
Note, Between the Boss]; Note, Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive
Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 Sr. Louis U.L.J. 239, 24l n.10
(1987) [hereinafter Note, Recent Developments]; cf. also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 17.2d
897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets."); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("ln each instance, the legal problem would be identical
to that confronting us now — the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her sex, the
employee would not have faced."): See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text for a
discussion of females harassing males.
27 E.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (allowing
Title VII claim for homosexual harassment), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984);
Wright v, Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. 111. 1981) (allowing Title VII
claim for homosexual harassment); Barlow v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 30 Fair Empl.
I'rac. Cas. (BNA) 223, 224 (N.D. 111. 1980) (allowing female employee's Title VII claim for
sexual harassment by her female supervisor). See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text
For a discussion of homosexual harassment.
26 E.g., King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Title VII violated where
nurse who engaged in sex with doctor received preferential treatment); Broderick v. Ruder,
685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.D.C. 1988) Critic VII violated where employer afforded pref-
erential treatment to employees who submitted to his sexual advances); Priest v. Rotary, 634
F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Title VII violated where sex yartners of the defendant
received preferential treatment); Toscano v. Nitnmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 (D. Del. 1983)
(Title VII violated where employer afforded preferential treatment to employees who sub-
mitted to his sexual advances). But see DeGintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807
F.2c1 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting expansion of Title VII to include cases of preferential
treatment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 455 (1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp.
495, 501 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (same), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). See infra notes
152-165 and accompanying text for a discussion of preferential treatment.
29 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (dictum) (court
stated that bisexual harassment was not gender discrimination), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); B.T. Jones v. Flagship Inel, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986) (dictum) (bisexual
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This note analyzes the suitability of Title VII for sexual ha-
rassment claims in light of modern cases expanding the number of
situations where sexual harassment has been found to violate Title
VII. Section I examines the early history of Title VII, demonstrat-
ing that the inclusion of "sex" within the protection of Title VII
was not the principle focus of that legislation." Section I also dis-
cusses the earliest cases where courts used Title VII to combat
discrimination based on gender." Section II traces the historical
expansion of Title VII, starting with the earlier cases that refused
to include sexual harassment in Title VII, the recognition of quid
pro quo harassment where tangible job benefits were made contin-
gent upon sexual' activity, and finally, the eventual inclusion of
"hostile environment" as constituting sexual harassment." Section
III highlights situations where courts have found sexual harassment
to violate Title VII, including female harassment of males, homo-
sexual harassment, and preferential treatment." Section IV ana-
lyzes these modern cases in light of the intended purpose of Title
VII, demonstrating that Title VII's prohibition of gender discrim-
ination does not logically or practically include sexual harassment
claims." Consequently, Section V advocates the enactment of sexual
harassment legislation that would alleviate these inconsistencies and
permit courts to use Title VII as Congress intended."
I. EARLY HISTORY OF TITLE. VII
This country's history of discrimination against blacks and
other minorities is well documented. Discrimination has been read-
ily apparent in the workplace, where talent often goes unused be-
cause of employers' prejudices." In an attempt to integrate blacks
harassment not gentler discrimination), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (I I th Cir. 1982) (dictum) (bisexual harassment not gender
discrimination); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.D.C. 1981) (same); Barnes v.
Comic, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.D.C. 1977) (dictum) (same).
" See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
of Title VII.
yi See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of early Title VII cases.
32 See infra notes 68-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recognition of
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.
33 See infra notes 128-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of modern situations
where sexual harassment has been found to violate Title VII.
54 See infra notes 166-206 and accompanying text for an analysis of the inclusion of
sexual harassment under Title VII.
"See infra Section V for a description of sexual harassment legislation.
36 110 CONG. REC, 6548 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964).
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and minorities into society and to promote hiring on the basis of
merit, Congress enacted Title VII." Through Tide VII, Congress
made it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any person because of his or her race, and, among
other things, sex."
Until the day before Congress passed Title VII, the bill did not
prohibit discrimination based on sex." On that day, an opponent
of the bill, Representative Howard Smith, added the word "sex" in
an amendment, reportedly in an attempt to defeat its passage.°
Representative Smith, proclaiming to be serious about the amend-
ment, read into the record a letter from a "lady." 41 The letter
complained of the numerical imbalance between men and women,
and spoke of the right of every female to have a husband. 42 Com-
mentators suggest that. these statements undermine Representative
Smith's claims of sincerity. 43
Because of the lack of legislative history, the proper interpre-
tation of "sex" in Title VII is unclear. An examination, however, of
the four types of early cases brought under Title VII sheds light
on the scope of "sex." Many cases involved challenges to employers'
outright exclusion of women from jobs.'" Another category of cases
involved restrictions that had a disproportionate impact on
women. 45 Other cases addressed restrictions placed on women but
not on men.4" Finally, a fourth group of cases arose from allegedly
discriminatory pregnancy policies. 47
In the most blatant form of discrimination, some employers
excluded all members of one sex from particular jobs. For example,
" id. at 6549 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
59 Miller, supra note 11, at 880.
.1 " 110 CLING. REC. 2577 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith); see Miller,
supra note II, at 884.
11 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).
42
 Id.
"See Miller, supra note 11, at 884; see also, Wells, Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 43
UMKC L. REV. 273, 274 (1975).
"E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1255 (9th Cir. 1971) (employer's
refusal to hire women for the position of agent-telegrapher violated Title VII).
45 E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (invalidating height and weight
restrictions).
45 E.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (refusal to hire women
with pre-school-age children violated Title VII).
" E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (no violation of Title
VII where disability plan excluded pregnancy). Pregnancy has since been brought within the
coverage of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1981).
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in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit in 1971 rejected the employer's ex-
clusion of women from the job of agent-telegrapher where the
employer felt that women were physically incapable of performing
the job:48 The Rosenfeld court refused to allow Southern Pacific's
contention that being male was a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion ("BFOQ") for the position of agent-telegrapher." The court
reasoned that the stereotype that women are weak could not be the
basis of a B FOQ. 5" Rather, the court stated that employees otherwise
qualified for a job could be excluded only on the basis of individual
inability to do the job, not on the basis of group traits.''
Similarly, courts held that restrictions having a disproportionate
impact on women violate Title V11. 52 In 1977, for example, the
United States Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson invalidated
height and weight restrictions imposed by an Alabama statute."
Although facially neutral, these restrictions disproportionately ex-
cluded women. 54
In Dothard, the plaintiff, Ms. Rawlinson, applied for employ-
ment as a prison guard but failed to meet the minimum 120-pound
weight, requirement." The district court found that the combination
" Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co„ 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir, 1971).
4 " Id. Tide VII provides the statutory defense that:
. . . it shall not he an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a lama fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1981).
This statutory exception to Title VII is extremely narrow, and therefore, an employer
can rarely justify a single-sex hiring policy as a BFOQ. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISC HIM /NATION § 13.00 (1988).
"" Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971).
51 Id. at 1225.
52 E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (invalidating height and weight
restrictions having a disproportionate effect on women); Caviale v. State of Wisconsin, Delft
of Health & Social Servs., 744 F,2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1984) (employer's decision to choose
from a pool of which two of two hundred members were women for job openings violated
Title VII). See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of disparate impact.
In disparate impact cases, a plaintiff alleges ihat a facially neutral employment device
works to exclude disproportionately members of a protected group. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971), The employer then hears the burden of showing that
the employment device is job related, Id. at 432.
53 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
5' Id, at 329.
55 Id. at 323-24. The statute also established a height minimum of 5 feet, 2 inches. Id,
at 324.
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of the height and weight restrictions would exclude 41.13 percent
of the female population while excluding less than 1 percent of' the
male population. In addition, Ms. Rawlinson also challenged a reg-
ulation that established gender criteria for assigning correctional
counselors to maximum-security institutions for positions requiring
close physical proximity to inmates, or "contact" positions. The
district court held that the height and weight requirements and the
regulation violated Title VII. 56
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding with
respect to the height and weight requirements. 57 The Court noted
that the defendants produced no evidence correlating those re-
quirements with the requisite amount of strength necessary for
good job performance. It held, however, that the district court erred
in ruling that being male is not a 13170Q for the "contact" positions.
The BFOQ exception, it noted, is a narrow one, valid only when
the hiring of one sex is the essence of the business operation!' In
so holding, the Court reasoned that inmates would be likely to
assault a woman because she was a woman, thereby posing a threat
not only to the victim, but also to the basic control of the penitentiary
and to the protection of its inmates and other security personne1. 5"
Thus, in the Court's view, the regulation did not reflect the pater-
nalism the Court believed Title VII sought to combat. 6°
In the early years of Title VII litigation, courts also held that
restrictions placed on one sex violated Title VII. Thus, in the 1971
case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co., the United States Supreme
Court struck clown the employer's policy of refusing to hire women
with pre-school-age children.''' In Phillips, the Court held that per-
sons of identical qualifications must be given opportunities regard-
less of their sex. The Court, however, - remanded the case on the
issue of whether the distinction between men and women with pre-
school-age children could qualify as a bona fide occupational qual-
ification."2
Other early Title VII cases often involved employee challenges
of employers' practices and policies regarding pregnancy. In General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court in 1976 held
5" Weal v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1180, 1183-85 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
DOihard, 433 U.S. at 332.
"" Id. at 331, 333, 336-37.
"
59
 Id. at 336.
6"Id. at 335 (quoting Frontier° v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
41 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curium).
July 1989]	 SEXUAL HARASSMENT	 1079
that, under Title VII, an employer could exclude female employees'
pregnancies from its disability plan." Reversing the lower courts,
the Court reasoned that although only women can become preg-
nant, that does not mean that every legislative classification con-
cerning pregnancy is based on sex." The Court noted that, although
a plaintiff sometimes can establish a Title VII violation upon proof
of a discriminatory effect, no such effect exists where there is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not."' Moreover,
the Court distinguished pregnancy from diseases typically covered
by disability plans and noted that pregnancy is often voluntary."
In sum, Title VII's legislative history provides little guidance
as to the proper scope or interpretation of "sex."" 7 In the early sex
discrimination cases, courts applied Title VII in a variety of situa-
tions. First, courts held that the outright exclusion of women from
particular jobs violated Title VII. In addition, courts rejected re-
strictions having a disproportionate impact on members of one sex.
The early courts also held that restrictions placed on women but
not men, such as rules against marriage and prohibitions against
women with pre-school-age children, violate Title VII. Finally, the
courts held that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability plans
did not constitute gender discrimination.
II. INCLUSION OF SEXUAL. HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
Currently, Title VII offers protection in situations where male
or female employers make tangible job benefits contingent upon
submission to sex in what is termed quid pro quo harassment.68 Title
VII also protects employees from sexually hostile work environ-
ments."9 The protection from quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment extends to homosexual as well as heterosexual
harassment." In addition, Title VII applies when co-workers re-
ceive preferential treatment as a result of their sexual relationships
with supervisors."
" General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
" Id. at 134 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
" Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U,S, 484, 496-97 (1974)), Likewise, women
were not protected from risks that men were not. Id.
"" Id. at 136.
"'Miller, supra note 11, at 844.
"8 E.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cur, 1979).
B" E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 64l F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
7" E.g., Wright v. Methodist Youth Servi., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. III. 1981).
7 E.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Despite the recent expansive application of Title VII, courts
initially were unwilling to allow claims for sexual harassment under
Title V11. 72 This unwillingness stemmed from a view that sexual
harassment is a personal attack, not - a gender issue. 73 In addition,
courts expressed a fear that allowing sexual harassment claims
would generate voluminous litigation. 74 These courts refused to
treat sexual harassment as a gender issue, and consequently, did
not allow a cause of action under Title VII.
For example, in 1975 the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona held that Title VII did not protect an employee
from sexual harassment." In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., a male
supervisor subjected female employees to physical and verbal sexual
advances. 76 Reasoning that the supervisor's conduct was a personal
proclivity, the court stated that he acted to satisfy a personal urge.
In other words, according to the court, the harassment was not a
company policy, but instead, the act of an individual. 77
In addition, the Come court noted the potential for voluminous
litigation. 78 Title VII, the court reasoned, would be implicated
whenever employees made sexual advances to one another. The
court stated that employers would be forced to hire asexual em-
ployees in order to avoid such situations. 7"
In the same way, in 1976, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey in Tomkins v. Public Services Electric & Gas
Co. held that Title VII does not protect employees from sexual
72 See Tomkins v. Public Servs. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
(sexual harassment not discrimination under Title VII), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977);
Miller v. Bank or Am., 118 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (court refused to recognize a
Title VII claim where plaintiff did not use department established by employer to investigate
such claims), reu'd and remanded, 600 F.2d 211, 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Conte v. Bausch & Lomb,
390 F. Supp. 161. 163-65 (D. Ariz. 1975) (woman subjected to verbal and physical sexual
advances failed to state a claim under Title VII), !mewed and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 123 (D,D.C. 1974) (plaintiff
fired for refusing her male superior's sexual advances failed to state a claim under Title
VII), reed sub nom. Barnes v. Costic, 561 F.2d 983, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
73 See, e.g., Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556 (sexual harassment not discrimination under
Title VII); Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163 (woman subjected to verbal and physical sexual advances
failed to state a claim under Tide VII); •
74
 E.g., Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556-57; Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Carrie, 390 F. Supp.
at 163.
7 ' Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163-64.
76 Id. at 163.
7 ' Id.
75 Id.
7 ' Id. at 163-64.
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harassment." In Tornkins, a male supervisor harassed a female office
worker by making sexual advances and detaining her against her
will at a business lunch through economic threats and physical force.
The court rejected her Title VII claim, expressing concern over
opening the floodgates to litigation. 8 ' The court reasoned that Con-
gress did not create Title VII to provide a federal tort remedy for
what is actually a physical attack motivated by sexual desire. 82 Em-
phasizing the difference between gender and sexual desire, the
court noted that gender is not the focus of the harassment. Thus,
the court recognized that sexual harassment is an unfortunate fea-
ture of our social experience, but held that it did not come within
Title VII's protection. 83
Shortly after Tornkins, courts began to allow claims for sexual
harassment under Title VII for quid pro quo harassment. where
tangible job benefits were made contingent upon sexual compli-
ance. 84 In 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit became one of the first courts to allow a quid
pro quo claim in Barnes v. Costle. 85 In Barnes, a female employee of
the Environmental Protection Agency claimed sexual harassment
where, despite her refusals, her male superior repeatedly solicited
her to join him for social activities." In addition,. he repeatedly
made sexual remarks to her, and suggested that her employment
status would benefit if she had an affair with him. The supervisor
fired her in retaliation for her refusals. 87
'" Tomkins v. Public Servs. Hee. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 55'3, 556-57 (D.N1 • . 1976).
81
 Id. at 555-57.
" Id. at 556. The court stated that Congress did not intend to create a federal tort
remedy fur a physical attack motivated by sexual desire that "happened to occur in a corporate
corridor rather than a back alley." Id.
83 Id.
8' Professor Catherine MacKinnon is generally acknowledged as having first noted the
distinction between quid pro quo type harassment and harassment resulting front a sexually
hostile environment. C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 5, at 32-47; sec also Miller v. Bank of Ant.,
600 F.2d '211, 212 (9th Cir. 1979) (female plaintiff fired for refusing supervisor's demand
cur sexual favors stated a claim under Title VII); Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1241 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (affirming lower court's recognition of a Title VII claim for sexual harassment);
Tomkins v. Public Servs. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff stated
Title VII claim where continued employment was conditioned upon submitting to male
supervisor's sexual advances); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (1).C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiff'
stated claim under Title VII where employer fired her in retaliation for her refusal to grant
sexual havors).
° 561 F.2d at 990.
8° Id. at 985.
87 Id.
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The court held that, "but for" her womanhood, the plaintiff's
supervisor would not have solicited her participation in sexual ac-
tivity." Thus, the appeals court established a "but for" standard,
which it used to conclude that the harassment of the plaintiff con-
stituted a Title VII claim. The court reasoned that the sexual ha-
rassment constituted discrimination based on gender because the
supervisor imposed upon her job tenure a condition that he would
not have imposed on a man."
Having recognized quid pro quo sexual harassment as Title VII
sex discrimination, courts soon began to expand the new cause of
action to include hostile environment sexual harassment.% Hostile
environment claims allege that working environments can become
so riddled with discrimination that they destroy the emotional and
psychological atmosphere of minority group workers."' Thus, hos-
tile environment claims treat Title VII as protecting psychological
as well as economic interests. 92
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in 1981 became one of the first. courts to recognize a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim." In Bundy v. Jackson,
the plaintiff did not suffer a loss of tangible job benefits, but rather
alleged that her supervisor's demeaning propositions and advances
destroyed her psychological and emotional work environment."'
When Bundy complained to a higher supervisor, he too proposi-
tioned her."5
The District of Columbia Circuit held that the plaintiff stated
a claim for sexual harassment.% The court reiterated the "but for"
standard it used in Barnes, noting that sexual harassment injects
sexual stereotypes into the work environment."' Moreover, the court
stated that as long as women remained a minority in the work force,
they would have little recourse in such situations." 8 Thus, the court
" Id. at 990.
" Id. at 989 n.49.
"') I loslile environnient claims had already been recognized under Title VII by the Fifth
Circuit in the context of race discrimination. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238, 241 (5th
Cir. 1971), cell. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
g' E.g., id. at 238.
92 Id.
13 Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (1).C. Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 944-45.
99 Id. at 940 This supervisor told Bundy that "any man in his right mind would want to
rape [her]." Id.
96 Id. at 948,
17 Id. at 942, 945.
" Id. at 945.
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noted, without such a cause of action employers would be immune
from liability for sexual harassment as long as they stopped short
of firing their victim. Later courts relied on Bundy and recognized
claims of sexually harassing environments.'•
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of sexual harassment for the first time in Meritor Savings Bank v. -
Vinson, holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under Title VII
for a sexually hostile environment.H") The dispute arose when a
female bank employee, Ms. Vinson, brought an action for sexual
harassment against both the bank where she worked and her su-
pervisor, Mr. Taylor.'" Over the course of several years, he had
intercourse with her forty or fifty times, fondled her in front of
other employees, and even forcibly raped her several times. She
alleged that she had succumbed to Taylor's demands for sex out of
fear of losing her job. 1 °" Upon being discharged for excessive use
of an indefinite sick leave, Vinson brought the action against both
the bank and Taylor.
The district court rejected the plaintiff's Title VII claim.'" The
court held that if there had been a sexual relationship, it had been
voluntary and was unrelated to her continued employment. The
district court held, furthermore, that the bank could not be held
liable for the supervisor's alleged harassment because it did not
have any notice of Taylor's actions.k 0"
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed, holding that the district court had not sufficiently consid-
ered the hostile environment claim.'" 5 Additionally, the court of
appeals held that the "voluntariness" of the plaintiff's sexual rela-
tionship with her supervisor was not determinative.'"6 It reasoned
that, if' the fact that a plaintiff gave in to a supervisor's demands
99 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (female air traffic controller
stated a Title VII claim where sexual harassment erected barriers to women's participation
in the work force); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
stated a claim for sexual harassment irrespective of whether she suffered tangible job det-
riment); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co,, 589 F. Supp. 780, 783 (E.D. Wis, 1984) (female
warehouse worker stated claim under Title VII for a hostile environment), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
'"" Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 78 (1986).
Id. at 60.
1112 Id.
"23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1980).
"14 Id. at 42.
'" 5 Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C, Cir. 1985).
"'" Id. at 196.
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were diapositive, a plaintiff would be forced into the difficult deci-
sion of choosing acquiescence, opposition, or resignation. Finally,
the court held that an employer is strictly liable for sexual harass-
ment by its supervisors. 117
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of ap-
peals, construing Title VII to include a prohibition of sexually
hostile work environments. 108 The Court also agreed that the plain-
tiff's voluntary sexual relationship did not necessarily defeat her
claim.'" In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew a distinction
between "voluntary" and "welcome," the latter being the gravamen
of a sexual harassment claim. The Court reasoned that the fact that
the relationship was "voluntary" in the sense that Ms. Vinson con-
sented to have sex was not a defense to a claim of sexual harass-
ment."° Vinson's provocative speech and dress, however, were not
per se inadmissible in determining whether she found particular
sexual advances unwelcome. On the contrary, the Court stated that
such evidence. was obviously relevant in judging the totality of the
circumstances. Thus, although refusing to hold that such evidence
is per se inadmissible, the Court left to the district court the deter-
mination of whether the evidence's admission would be unduly
prejudicial."'
Finally, the Supreme Court did not accept the court of appeals
imposition of strict liability on employers." 2 The majority did not,
however, issue a definitive rule on employer liability. Instead, the
Court relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
amicus curiae brief, which stated that courts should formulate rules
of employer liability by drawing from agency principles." 3 The
Court noted, however, that the absence of notice to an employer
did not automatically protect the employer from liability.'"
Since Vinson, courts have attempted to determine when an
environment is hostile for the purposes of Title VII. In Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in 1986 developed a standard for making such deter-
" 7 Id. at 150.
R's Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
"Id. at 68.
"" Id. at 68, 69.
'' Id.
" Id. at 72.
cis Id. The EEOC's position in its amicus curiae brief did not follow the EEOC guidelines,
which advocate the imposition of strict employer liability. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1988). For
a discussion of employer liability. see Note, supra note 1,
"4 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
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Initiations using EEOC guidelines, holding that the plaintiff did not
have an actionable claim for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment."' Although the guidelines are not binding, the court noted,
they have often been allotted favorable consideration by courts
addressing the issue of sexual harassment.' l'
In Rabidue, the plaintiff complained of sexually oriented posters
in the office." 7 She also complained about a fellow supervisor's
vulgar language. The court examined the totality of the work en-
vironment, including the nature of the harassment, the degree of
obscenity in the workplace before the plaintiff took the job, and the
personality of the plaintiff. Thus, the court held that both the
posters and the vulgarity had minimal effect on the plaintiff, es-
pecially when viewed in the context of a society that condones such
displays." 8
judge Keith concurred in part and dissented in part." 9 Judge
Keith stressed the "anti-female animus" of the office.' 2" He focused
on the fact that: Rabidue did not receive free lunches, free gasoline,
a telephone credit card, or entertainment privileges, as did other
salaried male employees.' 2 ' In addition, judge Keith noted that the
company did not invite her to its weekly golf matches.' 22 Finally, he
pointed out that after Rabidue became credit. manager, the defen-
dant did not allow her to take clients out to lunch as all previous
'1' 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (0th Cir. 1986). The court concluded that, to prevail in a Tide
VII offensive work environment sexual harassment action, a plaintiff must assert and prove
that:
(1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was
subjected Ur unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;
(3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the charged sexual
harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work
performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working envi-
ronment that affected seriously the psych logical Isic] well-being of the plaintiff;
and (5) the existence of respondeat. superior liability,
Id.
Id. at 619 n.4. The EEOC promulgated guidelines on November 10, 1980. See 29
§ 1604.11 (1988). These guidelines attempt to define sexual harassment, to instruct.
employers as to their potential liability, and to suggest. proper employer responses to the
problem of sexual harassment in the workplace. See, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)—(g) (1988).
Although the guidelines are not binding, courts indicate a willingness to give them substantial
consideration. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
l" 805 F.2d 622.
It' Id. at 620, 622,
"" Id. at 623 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120 Id.
'2' Id.
122 Id. at 621 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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male credit managers had been able to do. Upon requesting such
privileges, Rabidue's supervisor replied that it would be improper
for a woman to take male customers to lunch and that she might
have car problems.' 23 Thus, Judge Keith argued that Ms. Rabiclue
had been a victim of discrimination because the defendant excluded
her, the only female in management, from activities in which she
needed to participate to do her job properly. 124
In Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held in 1988 that the harassment
of a male employee by his male co-workers likewise did not violate
Title VII. In Goluszek, the male plaintiff, an electronic maintenance
mechanic, brought a Title VII action alleging sexual harassment by
his male co-workers. Goluszek's co-workers accused him of being
gay or bisexual, and poked him in the buttocks with a stick. Goluszek
complained to the general foreman, who considered the behavior
and statements to be mere shop talk. 125
The district court held that Goluszek's claim was not actionable
under Title VII. The court ruled that, although a fact-finder could
reasonably conclude that H.P. Smith would have stopped the har-
assment if Goluszek had been a woman, Goluszek's harassment was
not the type of conduct Congress intended to prohibit when it
enacted Title VII. The court reasoned that sexual harassment was
actionable under Title VII when it reflected the use of a powerful
position to impose sexual demands on an unwilling person in a less
powerful position. The court, therefore, emphasized the fact that
Goluszek was a male in a male-dominated environment. Thus, it
concluded that Goluszek may have been harassed because he was a
male, but that the harassment did not create an anti-male environ-
ment. 126
Nonetheless, after Vinson, sexual harassment is clearly sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.' 27 Although courts first held that Title
VII did not prohibit sexual harassment because such harassment is
a personal, non-gender oriented action, courts gradually extended
Title VII to cover situations where an employer hinged tangible job
benefits upon an employee's submission to sex. Eventually, courts
extended this quid pro quo harassment to include sexually hostile
12]
124 Id,
Goluszek v. 1-1.1'. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1454, 1956 (0. 111. 1988).
1 '6 1d. at 1456.
127 Nleritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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environment claims where no tangible detriment existed, yet the
harassment pervaded the working atmosphere to such an extent as
to interfere with job performance. Subsequent courts, therefore,
have been left to determine at what point a work environment
becomes so hostile that it violates Title VII.
l. MODERN SITUATIONS WHERE SEXUAL HARASSMENT HAS BEEN
FOUND To VIOLATE TITLE VII
A. Application of the "But For" Standard
Courts addressing the issue of sexual harassment continue to
apply the "but for" standard, originally developed in Barnes v. Costle,
to sexual harassment claims.'" In Barnes, the court reasoned that,
"but for" the plaintiff's womanhood, her participation in sex would
not have been solicited.' 2• Thus, the Barnes court held that the
supervisor placed an employment condition on the female subor-
dinate that he would not have placed on a male.'" Accordingly, the
Barnes "but for" test requires the court to determine whether the
alleged harassment would have occurred "but for" the plaintiff's
gender. 13 '
Several commentators have suggested that the "but for" rea-
soning applies equally well to men alleging sexual harassment.' 32 In
each instance, the court must determine whether the employee
would have been harassed "but for" his or her sex.'" Although such
claims rarely appear to be litigated, a recent survey by the Bureau
of National Affairs suggests that companies do receive complaints
of women harassing men. Thus, men may also claim protection
under Title VII from sexual harassment by women. 13 't
' 28 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
' 2" Barnes, 501 17.2d at 990.
''" Id. at 989-90 n.49.
I " N. at 990.
'' See, e.g., Conte & Gregory, supra note 26, at 417 n.41; Note, Meritor Savings Bank v,
Vinson: What Makes a Work Environment "Hustile"?, 40 ARK, L. REV, 857 n.1 (1987); Note,
Between the Boss, supra note 26, at 445 n.4; Note, Recent Developments, supra note 26, at 241
n.10.
133 E.g., RabidLIC v. Osceola Rel. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 981
U.S. 1041 (1087). The court staled that, to prove a claim of abusive work environment
premised upon sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she would not. have
been the object of harassment but for her sex."
' 34 Sexual Harassment: Employer Policies and Problems, Personnel Policies Forum Survey No.
144 (BNA), at 16-17 (June 1987).
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In addition, courts have applied the "but for" analysis and
allowed a claim for discrimination under Title VII where a member
of one sex sexually harasses a member of the same sex. For example,
in 1981 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, in Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., held that Title
VII protected an employee from homosexual harassment.'" In
Wright, the defendant, Hillerman, allegedly fired the plaintiff, Don-
ald Wright, for refusing his homosexual advances.'" The court
reasoned that Hillerman would not have made sexual demands of
female employees, and therefore, that Wright would not have been
harassed "but for" his sex. Thus, the court extended Title VII,
formerly applied only to complaints of heterosexual harassment, to
encompass a claim of homosexual harassment.'"
In 1983, in Joyner u. AAA Cooper Transportation, the Federal
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama also held that
homosexual harassment violates Title VII.'" In Joyner, the defen-
dant, a male terminal manager, propositioned Joyner, a male shop
mechanic, at a local restaurant.'" Joyner complained about the
incident to the chairman of the board, who informed the terminal
manager. The company eventually laid Joyner off because of a
sloWdown in business. 14 f' The court used the same "but for" analysis
used in cases of heterosexual harassment.' 41 The court concluded,
therefore, that joyner's bid to return to work after the layoff would
not have been rejected "but for" his refusal to succumb to the
homosexual demands of his supervisor.''''
This "but for" analysis does not encompass a cause of action in
the case of the bisexual supervisor. There are no reported cases of
bisexual employers harassing both male and female employees.'''"
Nonetheless, several cases discuss the problem in dicta, positing that
bisexual harassment would not be considered discrimination based
on sex under Title VII.' 4 ' This conclusion stems from courts' ap-
1 " 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
ose Id. at 309-10.
137 Id .
'" 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
''" Id. at 530.
"" Id. at 540.
141 Compare Joyner, 597 F. Supp. 537 with Barnes v. Comte, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
142 Id, at 544.
14 ' See Noic, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
11.4kv. L. REV. 1449, 1454 n.28 (1984) (situation or bisexual harassment has yet to appear in
a reported case).
' 4 ' E.g., Itabidue v. Osceola Rel. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (dicta) (bisexual
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plication of the "but for" standard. In Barnes v. Castle, the court of
appeals suggested that the legal problem would be the same in cases
where a man harasses a woman, a woman harasses a man, or a
homosexual harasses a member of the same gender. The court
distinguished these situations from one where a bisexual supervisor
harasses employees of both sexes. The court reasoned that, in the
case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual favors
would not. constitute discrimination because it would apply equally
to male and female employees."'
Some courts have compared bisexual harassment to racial har-
assment, as in the 1974 case of Bradford v. Sloan Paper Co. In Brad-
ford, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
held that, where members of two races received like treatment, no
discrimination existed.'" In Bradford, two black employees brought
suit under Title VII alleging racial discrimination affecting wages,
promotions, restroom facilities ; harassment, disparate discipline,
and discharge from employment.'" Addressing the claim of har-
assment, the court reasoned that, although the assistant. warehouse
manager's actions were indefensible and unwarranted, they did not
reflect racial bias because he offended equally members of all
races.'" Thus, although there have been no reported cases involv-
ing a bisexual supervisor, courts have indicated their willingness to
follow the reasoning in cases such as Bradford and have rejected the
idea that Title VII encompasses bisexual harassment.'•
In sum, most courts applying the "but for" standard have sug-
gested that female harassment of males and homosexual harassment
constitute sexual harassment.'"" No court yet has decided whether
bisexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.
Many courts have stated in dicta, however, that bisexual harassment
harassment not covered by Title VII), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Jones v. Flagship
1nel, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986) (dicta) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (I lib Cir. 1982) (dicta) (same); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (1).C. Cir.. 1981) (dicta) (same); Barnes, 56l F.2d at 990 n.55
(dicta) (same).
'"Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 11.5.
1413 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (dicta) (court indicated that the situation of bisexual harass-
ment would he similar 10 the situation in Bradford a. Sloan Paper Ca., 383 F. Supp. 1157, 1161
(N.D. Ala. 1974)); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (dicta) (same).
' 47 Bradford, 383 F. Supp. at 1159.
' 4' Id. at 1161.
149 E.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
"" See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of females harassing
males and of homosexual harassment.
1090	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [vol. 30:1071
is not Title VII discrimination because the employee would still
have been harassed had he or she been of a different gender)."
B. Preferential Treatment Sexual Harassment
Recently, courts have followed the suggestion of the EEOC
guidelines and have expanded hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims to include those situations where plaintiffs' co-workers
received preferential treatment based on their submission to supe-
riors' sexual advances) 52
 Although the plaintiff is not placed in a
quid pro quo situation, courts have stated that, because his or her co-
workers' promotions were based on sex, the sexually offensive con-
duct affected the plaintiff's terms and conditions of employment)"
Thus, although the plaintiff was not the target of harassment, the
harassment of other employees created a claim for the plaintiff)"
In 1983, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware allowed a Title VII claim for sexual harassment where
'" E.g., Rnbidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (dicta) (bisexual harassment not covered by Title V11);
Jones v. Flagship Ina 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986) (dicta) (same), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1065 (1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (I Ith Cir. 1082) (dicta)
(same); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7 (dicta) (same); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (dicta) (same).
' 52 E.g., King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cognizable cause of action
for nurse where nurse who engaged in sex with doctor received preferential treatment);
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.D.C. 1988); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp.
571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (waitress stated claim under Title VII where sex partners of the
defendant. received preferential treatment); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (I). Del.
1983). But see DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.
1986) (rejecting expansion of Title VII to include cases of preferential treatment), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 455 (1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Pa.
1988), tiff 'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). The EEOC guidelines state:
(g) Other related practices: Where employment opportunities or benefits are
granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's requests fir
sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination
against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment
opportunity or benefit.
29 C. FR. 1604.1 1(g) (1988).
' 51 See, e.g., Tuscan°, 570 F. Supp. at 1199.
154 E.g., King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1085) (cognizable cause of action
for female nurse where a nurse who engaged in sex with doctor received preferential
treatment); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.D.C. 1988) (female lawyer stated
claim where numerous sexual affairs of limr male supervisors created a hostile environment);
Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (waitress stated claim under Title
VII where sex partners of the defendant received preferential treatment); Toscano v. Nimmo,
570 F, Supp. 1197 (I). Del. 1983) (woman stated a claim where the woman who received a
promotion was having an affair' with the supervisor). But see DeCintio v. Westchester County
Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting expansion of Title VII to include
cases of preferential treatment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 455 (1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 5111 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aird mem., 8511 F.2c1 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
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co-workers received preferential treatment. 155
 In Toscano v. Niniino,
the plaintiff, a Medical Administration Assistant at the Veterans
Administration, filed suit under Title VII, claiming that she was
denied a promotion, and instead, another woman received the pro-
motion because she was having an affair with Segovia, her super-
visor. In holding that preferential treatment violated Title VII, the
court reasoned that submitting to sex was a condition of employ-
ment, and therefore, that Toscano would not have been treated in
the same way had she been a man. 15"
Similarly, in Broderick v. Ruder in 1988, the District Court for
the District of Columbia allowed the plaintiff's Title VII claim.'"
In Broderick, the plaintiff, a female staff attorney for a division of
the Security and Exchange Commission, complained about the nu-
merous sexual affairs between four male supervisors and their sub-
ordinates, alleging that they created a hostile environment.' 5H Re-
lying on Toscano, the Broderick court also stated that such conduct
creates a hostile or offensive work environment that affects the
motivation and work performance of those offended by such con-
duct.' 59 The district court reversed the EEOC's finding of no dis-
crimination, holding that the plaintiff had proven sexual harass-
ment by demonstrating that the four male supervisors bestowed
preferential treatmem upon those employees who submitted to
their advances.'""
Not all courts agree that preferential treatment constitutes Title
VII gender discrimination.'"' In DeCintio v. Westchester County Med-
ical Center, in 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that preferential treatment does not violate
Title VII.' 62 In DeCintio, the defendant created a position for an
assistant chief of respiratory therapy and required that applicants
be registered with the National Board of Respiratory Therapists. 165
None of the plaintiffs, male physical therapists, were registered,
and the defendant gave the position to a woman romantically in-
volved with the Program Administrator of the Respiratory Therapy
L"Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1206.
' 56 Id. al 1198, 1199.
' 57 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (1).1).C. 1988).
' 5 " Id. at 1270.
'" Id, at 1278.
161 E.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2(1 304 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. CI. 455 ( 1987).
1"2 Id. at 308.
' 63 hi. at 305.
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Department. Refusing to recognize the plainfiff's claim, the DeCintio
court explicitly rejected a broad expansion of Title VII protec-
tion)" The court found no justification for defining "sex" so
broadly as to include an ongoing, voluntary, romantic engagement.
In doing so, it distinguished Toscano, where the employer's acts were
coercive.'"'
Thus, applying the "but for" test, courts have extended the
sexual harassment claim to cover harassment of men by women and
homosexual harassment. Bisexual harassment does not appear to
be covered. Moreover, some courts have allowed employees to state
a claim for discrimination when the conduct is not directed at them
personally. These situations are placed under the rubric of "hostile
environment" sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
IV. ANALYSIS OF APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII TO SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES
The judicial expansion of Title VII to sexual harassment is
improper. Based on Title VI l's legislative history, it is clear that
Congress gave little or no thought to the inclusion of "sex" in the
statute, much less to "sexual harassment."'" Congress intended to
equalize job opportunities, not regulate sexual activity in the work-
place.
The early cases brought under Title VII challenged policies or
practices directed at or affecting women as a group. For example,
the Court in Dotard v. Rawlinson held that height and weight re-
strictions not tailored to the job.in question worked against women
as a group, because such restrictions exclude a substantially greater
number of women than men. 1 "7 Similarly, the Court held that the
employer's refusal in Phillips v. Martin Marietta to hire women with
pre-school-age children represented a policy directed at a group of
women solely because they were women. 168 Several lower federal
courts have held that rules prohibiting married women from hold-
ing certain jobs constitute a similar attack on women as a group) 69
1 "4 H. at 307.
Ili5
16" See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text for a discussion oldie legislative history
of Title VII.
' 67 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
' 6" 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (per curiatii).
61 '-'	 Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (no
marriage rule violates Title VII), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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In contrast, sexual harassment is directed at an individual. As
stated by the district court in Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., where
the employer subjected female employees to verbal and physical
advances, an employer satisfies a personal urge when he or she
harasses an employee. 17" Although offensive, this personal urge is
not an attack upon women as a group as in other Title VII cases."'
Despite the unfortunate fact that some harassment might reflect
the aggressor's societal or personal views of the opposite sex, often
women, sexual harassment is an individual assault.
Despite the conceptual differences between traditional Title
VII cases and sexual harassment, courts have demonstrated a will-
ingness to expand Title VII to include such a claim. This willingness
stemmed from the difficulties associated with bringing sexual ha-
rassment claims in tort, according to one commentator. 372 The
court's opinion in Bundy v. Jackson,'" the first case to recognize a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim, also suggests that
these difficulties might have been at the foundation of its recogni-
tion of a hostile environment claim. The court reasoned that, as
long as women remain inferior to men in the workplace, they would
have little protection against harassment. 17't Thus, the Bundy court
apparently stretched Title VII, not because it applied, but because
of the victims' lack of viable alternative remedies.
By expanding Title VII to include sexual harassment, courts
reacted more to the reprehensibility of sexual harassment than to
the applicability of Title VII. For example, in Bundy, the court
questioned how sexual harassment could not be illegal, given the
fact that it involves demeaning sexual stereotypes. 175 The court,
170 390 F. Su pp. 161, 163 (1). Ariz. 1975).
' 71 See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of early cases brought
under Title VII.
'" Note, Between the Boss, supra note 26, at 464. This note states that:
First, since Mile VIII specifically recognizes sexual harassment as a cause of
action, it removes from the discretion of the judge issues about the validity and
sufficiency of the injury and the amount of "outrageousness" necessary for a
successful claim. The sexual harassment cause of action thus legitimates the
injuries women suffer from sexual advances. Under tort law the question of the
sufficiency of the injury is left to die judge: traditionally, sexual advances were
nut considered to be sufficient injury. (footnotes omitted)
'" 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'" Id. at 945.
17 ' M. ("How then can sexual harassment, which injects the most demeaning sexual
stereotypes into the general work environment and which always represents an intentional
assault on an individual's innermost privacy, nut be illegal?").
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therefore, reasoned that because such behavior should be illegal, it.
is, under Title V II. 176
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964 to outlaw discriminatory
behavior, not all behavior of which we strongly disapprove. ] i7 Al-
though supervisors' abuse of authority for personal purposes is an•
unfortunate and unattractive feature of our social experience,
which might well give rise to a civil action in tort, early courts were
correct in holding that sexual harassment is not sex discrimination
within the meaning of Title VII even when the purpose is sexual. 178
It is inappropriate for courts, in effect, to write legislation, or in
this case, to rewrite it, whenever they object to certain behavior.
Because sexual harassment is an individual rather than a gen-
der issue, the Supreme Court erred in Meritor Savings Bank v.
VinsonE 79 in allowing a Title VII hostile environment claim for sexual
harassment. Reasoning that sexual harassment creating a hostile
environment violates Title VII, the Vinson Court held that evidence
of provocative speech and dress is not per se inadmissible and that
the welcomeness of the sexual acts is the gravamen of a claim.'"
These considerations highlight the nature of sexual harassment as
an individual affront. If the environment is hostile to one gender,
then characteristics of the plaintiff should be, and typically are,
immaterial. For example, in a claim of a racially hostile environ-
ment, no one would dare suggest that it was not hostile if the
victimized individual possessed some of the stereotyped character-
istics. It is equally unacceptable for the Court to suggest that a
woman, by her choice in clothes and speech, volunteers to be ha-
rassed.' 81
An examination of the modern applications of the "but for"
standard illustrates the problems with this strained expansion of
Title VII. 182
 In the case of heterosexual harassment, courts have
reasoned that an employer would not harass an employee "hut for"
the fact that the employee is a man or woman. It is, however, more
accurate for a court to state that, "but for" the employer's sexual
176 id.
'" Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Burk, J.,
dissenting).
'7"See supra note 17 for examples of courts denying a claim for sexual harassment.
"" 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
'8" Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
' 8 ' See Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Sexual Harassuffnl at Work, 10 HARv.
Wow:Ws L.J. 203, 221 (1987).
"'See supra notes 68-165 and accompanying text for a discussion of the expansion of
Title VII.
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attraction to the employee, the employee would not have been
harassed. This reformulation of the problem emphasizes that sexual
harassment is an individual attack.
The "but. for" standard also applies to the cases of homosexual
harassment because a homosexual supervisor harasses only mem-
bers of his or her sex.'" An analysis of the "but for" standard,
however, as applied to homosexual harassment illustrates the diffi-
culties 'inherent in this extension of Title VII. As in the case of
heterosexual harassment, homosexual harassment is an individual
action or attack, rather than one against a group, based on gender.
In addition, homosexual harassment lacks the discriminatory intent
often accompanying gender discrimination; it is unlikely that a
woman who sexually harasses another woman does so on the basis
of stereotypical notions about the proper role or abilities of women.
It also seems unlikely that Congress intended to protect members
of one sex from the sexual advances of members of the same sex.
Thus, the very existence of homosexual harassment highlights the
idea that sexual harassment is based on sexuality, not on gender.
Despite the analytical problems with homosexual harassment
as a Title VII violation, the "hitt for" standard does protect em-
ployees in such situations.'" The standard's application, however,
excludes bisexual harassment from Title VII's protection.'" Al-
though the problem of the bisexual supervisor is not typical and
has not appeared in a reported case,' 86 the application of the "but
for" approach to bisexual harassment illustrates the logic problems
that. permeate the treatment of sexual harassment as a gender issue.
The earlier cases refusing to allow sexual harassment claims
foresaw this problem.' 87 The court in Come v. Bausch & Lomb went
so far as to say it would be "ludicrous" to call sexual harassment
'" E.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd
mem,, 749 F.2d 732 (1:1th Cir. 1984).
"" E.g., id.
See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (fith Cir. 1986) (dictum)
(court stated that bisexual harassment was not gender discrimination), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987); B.T. Jones v. Flagship Ina 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986) (dictum)
(bisexual harassment not gender discrimination), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (ilth Cir. 1982) (dictum) (bisexual harassment not
gender discrimination); Bundy v. ,Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.D.C. 1981); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.D.C. 1977) (dictum) (bisexual harassment not gender
discrimination).
1 "" See Note, supra note 143, at 1454 n.28.
187 Sec generally supra note 17 for a discussion of early cases refusing to allow a Title
Vii claim for sexual harassment.
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gender discrimination because to do so would mean there would
be no basis for suit where the offending party directed the conduct
at both men and women.' 88 The concurrence in Vinson v. Taylor
demonstrated this flaw colorfully, stating that it is unlikely that
Congress intended to protect women from unwelcome heterosexual
or lesbian advances but leave them unprotected when a bisexual
attacks. 189
Nonetheless, courts that have addressed the question of bisex-
ual harassment have stated that the equal treatment allotted to men
and women by the employer who harasses both sexes removes such
harassment from Title V11.' 9° It is not logical, however, that a
woman denied a promotion because she failed to submit to her
bisexual supervisor's advances should be treated differently from a
woman denied a promotion by a heterosexual or homosexual su-
pervisor. An application of the "but for" test used in Barnes v.
Costle' 9 ' to hold the male employer liable for quid pro quo harassment
of a female employee does create this anomalous result. This dif-
ferent treatment of bisexual harassment is unwarranted, because
the offensiveness of the harassment is not lessened merely because
the employer also harasses men. To the woman it is the harassment
itself that offends.
Sexual harassment as gender discrimination under Title VII
stands on equally uneasy footing when applied to cases where co-
workers receive promotions ahead of a plaintiff based on their
sexual relationship with the supervisor. For example, in Broderick v.
Ruder, the court held that the preferential treatment allotted to
women who slept with their supervisors reduced the plaintiff's mo-
tivation and work performance and deprived the plaintiff of pro-
I " 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (The court stated that lift would be ludicrous
to hold that the sort of activity involved here was contemplated by the Act because to do so
would mean that if the conduct complained or was directed equally to males there would be
no basis for suit.").
"" 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 11.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Bork, J., dissenting). Judge
Bork stated that:
Thus, this court holds that only the differentiating libido runs afinil of Tide
VII, and bisexual harassment, however blatant and however offensive and
disturbing, is legally permissible. Had Congress been aiming at sexual harass-
ment, it seems unlikely that a woman would be protected from unwelcome
heterosexual or lesbian advances but left unprotected when a bisexual attacks.
Id.
''" E.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref, Co., 805 F.2d (ill, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (dicta), art. thoued,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of
bisexual harassment.
19 ' 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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motions and job opportunities. 1 "2 The Broderick court followed the
EEOC guidelines in holding that preferential treatment created a
hostile work environment affecting the job performance of those
offended by such conduct.•'
The preferential treatment cases highlight the inappropriate-
ness of treating sexual harassment as gender discrimination. The
real message is that employment decisions should not be made on
the basis of who has a sexual relationship with the boss. By address-
ing this problem with Title VII, however, courts have created the
anomalous result that, under identical circumstances, a male or a
female employee could claim successfully that he or she had been
discriminated against on the basis of sex. For example, assume that
a woman has received a promotion because she granted sexual
favors to the employer. According to the EEOC guidelines, the man
refused the promotion could state a Title VII claim because he
received different treatment as a result of his sex."a In the same
hypothetical, however, the woman also states a Title VII claim be-
cause the granting of sexual favors is condition of employment to
which women — but not men — are subjected.' 95
At first glance, this result appears to be the correct one, due to
what is, hopefully, a general consensus that employees should be
promoted on the basis of merit and not on the basis of their will-
ingness to have sex with their employer. Analytically, however, it is
difficult to understand how a situation can be said to discriminate on
the basis of gender when both men and women can state a claim.
Moreover, it is impossible to reconcile the reasoning that permits a
claim for both individuals in this hypothetical with that reasoning
used in the situation of the bisexual supervisor where equal, albeit
poor, treatment of male and female employees removes the harass-
ment from Title VII's protection. If both men and women are
affected, the situation would be analogous to Bradford v. Sloan Paper
Go., where the court held that the equal, albeit poor, treatment
allotted blacks and whites negated a claim under Title VII."' In
the same way, therefore, co-worker preferential treatment should
fall outside of Title VII, because both groups receive equal treat-
191
 685 F. Supp, 1269, 1277 (D.D,C, 1988).
"3 Id. at 1278.
194 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.63(e) (1988).
195 E.g., Tuscan() v. Ninuno, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (following 29 CAR.
§ 1604.11(0.
383 F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (no Title VII action where both blacks and
whites treated poorly).
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merit. Nonetheless, courts have extended Title VII to include pref-
erential treatment cases for lack of a better solution to the problem.
Sexual harassment case law, especially as currently expanded,
trivializes Title VII's important purpose. An examination of the
different approaches of the majority and concurrence in the 1986
decision in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining 0). 197 helps to illustrate the
damage done to Title VII in sexual harassment cases. In Rabidue,
the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claim of a sexually hostile
environment. 1 °8 In examining whether a hostile environment ex-
isted, the court focused mainly on sexual behavior, especially that
of Douglas Henry, a supervisor from another department.'" The
court stressed Henry's vulgarity and crudity and the fact that he
customarily made obscene comments about women generally, oc-
casionally directing such comments at Rabidue. 20° Moreover, the
court noted that other male employees displayed pictures of nude
or partially dressed women in their offices. The court reasoned that
Henry's obscenities, although annoying, did not affect the totality
of the workplace."'
Instead of focusing on the sexual behavior in the office, Judge
Keith, concurring in part and dissenting in part, emphasized the
office's anti-female atmosphere. 202 Rather than looking at the indi-
vidual acts of one employee, Judge Keith highlighted the secondary
status regularly allotted to Ms. Rabidue, the only female in man-
agement. 203 For example, he noted that Osceola Refining refused
to let her take clients to lunch, seated Rabidue with clerical em-
ployees at a meeting, and refused to give her other privileges, such
as a telephone credit card and free gas, that male salaried employees
enjoyed. 204
The two opposing views of the merits of the case illustrate the
problem with the present state of the law, which places sexual
harassment claims under Title VII. Although the sexual conduct
that the majority emphasized certainly bears on the question of
whether a hostile environment existed, overemphasis of this behav-
ior caused the majority to ignore the evidence of disparate treat-
197 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986),
"Id, at 623.
199 Id. at 615, 623.
200 1d. at 615.
2O Id. at 622.
2"2 Id. at 623 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2°5 Id. at 629 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
294 Id.
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ment discussed by Judge Keith. As his concurrence argued, the
majority's underemphasis of this disparate treatment was inappro-
priate because it was this unequal treatment of the sexes that Con-
gress sought to prohibit with Tide VII. By shifting the focus in
sexual harassment cases from gender-based disparate treatment to
sexually offensive conduct, courts such as the Rabidue court lose
sight of the important gender questions at stake.
A further problem is that Title VII is ill-suited to deal effec-
tively with the problem because it does not reach all situations. In
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, for example, the male plaintiff did not suc-
ceed in his claim for hostile environment sexual harassment under
Title VII. Goluszek claimed that his co-workers' crude and derog-
atory comments, of which H.P. Smith had notice, created a hostile
environment. 2 • Clearly, Goluszek's co-workers sexually harassed
him by accusing him of being gay and by poking him with a stick
in the buttocks, yet Goluszek did not fit within Title VII's protection.
The result in Goluszek is analytically correct under Title VII's "but
for" reasoning. It is illogical to suggest that an all-male environment
was hostile to men on the basis of gender. Nonetheless, had Golu-
szek been a woman, he would probably have had a strong Title VII
claim.'" Mr. Goluszek, therefore, would have no way to challenge
behavior that a woman could attack by way of Title VII.
Therefore, a situation exists where conduct directed at a mem-
ber of one sex constitutes Title VII discrimination, but identical
conduct directed at a member of the other sex does not. This
anomalous result reflects the fact that sexual harassment does not
logically belong under the rubric of Title VII. No one doubts that
sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in the workplace, and a
barrier to merit-based employment decisions. It is not, however,
gender discrimination as prohibited by Title VII. The treatment of
bisexual harassment and preferential treatment highlights the in-
appropriateness of Title VII as a tool to combat sexual harassment.
This overextension of Title VII by the courts not only weakens Tide
VII, but it also fails to cover cases of sexual harassment that the
"but for" test: does not reach.
2" Goluszek v. 14.1 3 . Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453-56 (N.D. 111. 1988).
2"" Compare Goluszek v.1-1.1', Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 with Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co.,
589 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (E D. Wis. 1984) (female warehouse worker, one of two females
employed, prevailed in sexual harassment claim despite defendant's contention that a male
employee with plaintiff's personality would have suffered equally brutal harassment), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
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V. PROPOSED SEXUAL HARASSMENT LEGISLATION
Enacting legislation with the primary purpose of combatting
sexual harassment in the workplace would avoid the practical and
conceptual prbblems associated with treating sexual harassment as
gender discrimination. Sexual harassment legislation would address
the heart of the problem — the inappropriateness of sexual ha-
rassment — rather than address the problem by way of a strained
reading of Title VII. The new law would have three beneficial
effects. First, it would alleviate the theoretical and analytical prob-
lems associated with defining sexual harassment as "gender discrim-
ination" under Title VII. Second, it would provide a claim for
plaintiffs where Title VII is presently inapplicable. More specifically,
it would provide a cause of action for plaintiffs not presently in-
cluded under Title VII, such as victims of bisexual harassment and
victims in a single-sex environment. Finally, the proposed legislation
would end the distortion of Title VII, thereby returning Title VI I's
emphasis to legitimate gender issues.
Sexual harassment legislation would distinguish between ha-
rassment based on one's gender and harassment based on one's
sexuality. Title VII properly covers the former. The latter, however,
would be the target of the new legislation. In other words, the new
legislation would have as its goal the removal from the workplace
of inappropriate sexual conduct.
By distinguishing between sexuality and gender, sexual harass-
ment legislation would encompass sexual harassment situations
presently covered by Title VII. More importantly, it would go be-
yond these cases to protect victims of bisexual harassment and of
harassment in the single-sex environment, where sexual harass-
ment, though admittedly pervasive, is not based on gender. 207 Al-
though the proposed legislation would create a cause of action for
plaintiffs otherwise excluded from coverage under Title VII, it
would not result in a storm of litigation. Because Title VII, as
extended, presently prohibits most forms of sexual harassment,
2" One commentator proposed a state "Fair Employment Practices Act" which included
a prohibition against sexual harassment. Friedman, Fair Employment Legislation in Lousiana: A
Critique of the 1983 Act and a Proposed Substitute Statute, 58 Tin_ L. Rev. 444, 489-90 (1983).
Friedman noted that his:
subsection ... goes beyond Title VII and does not limit acts of sexual harass-
ment to acts directed only at members of one sex— i.e., it would not be necessary
for a plaintiff to prove that the harassment would not have occurred if he or
she had been of the opposite gender.
Id.
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sexual harassment legislation would merely act to simplify the
courts' analysis by removing the ill-fitting "but for" standard. Sexual
harassment legislation would have the added benefit of returning
Title V1I's emphasis to legitimate issues of gender discrimination.
This shift in focus is necessary, given courts' tendency to overem-
phasize physical harassment at the expense of thoughtful exami-
nation of true gender issues.
Admittedly, Congress is not likely to pass this legislation given
the fact that the "but for" analysis includes the more recurring
situations of sexual harassment. Moreover, because sexual harass-
ment is such a problem, the use of Title VII as a weapon to combat
it is preferable to having no weapon at all. Nonetheless, because of
the analytical problems inherent in treating sexual harassment as
gender discrimination, separate legislation would be the ideal alter-
native.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment is a significant problem in the workplace.
Using Title VII to combat it, however, inappropriately forces sexual
harassment cases into a framework of gender discrimination anal-
ysis to which it is ill-suited. Consequently, there are serious analytical
problems in treating sexual harassment as gender discrimination.
More significant than these academic problems is the practical prob-
lem that the present approach fails to address some situations, such
as bisexual harassment and harassment in a single-sex environment.
Although these situations are rare, they are as reprehensible as
those cases currently included under Title VI 1. There should, there-
fore, be a comparable federal remedy for plaintiff's harassed by
bisexuals or plaintiffs harassed in a single-sex environnkent. The
legislation described in Section V would provide this remedy. More-
over, it would have the added benefit of stopping the distortion of
Title VII, thereby allowing Title VII to be used properly, as a tool
to combat gender discrimination.
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